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	<title>Open Source Security &#187; metrics</title>
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	<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog</link>
	<description>A blog about open source and security and open source security</description>
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		<title>Spam, spam, spam, spam</title>
		<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2009/10/01/spam-spam-spam-spam/</link>
		<comments>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2009/10/01/spam-spam-spam-spam/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2009 22:05:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Emily Ratliff</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ratliff.net/blog/?p=243</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The September 2009 edition of the Communications of the ACM had a very fascinating article called Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion. Aside from the catchy title, this article is well worth a read. You will definitely understand more about spam after doing so. Given how much fun the authors must have had [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The September 2009 edition of the Communications of the ACM had a very fascinating article called <a href="http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2009/9/38908-spamalytics-an-empirical-analysis-of-spam-marketing-conversion/abstract">Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion</a>. Aside from the catchy title, this article is well worth a read. You will definitely understand more about spam after doing so. Given how much fun the authors must have had doing the background research for this article, it seems a shame to quibble with it, but there were a couple of things that set my teeth on edge so I&#8217;ll do so anyway. Besides, it gives me the reason to point out this article which really is a fun read. With that said, here are the things about the article that that affected me like nails on a chalkboard.</p>
<p>The article starts off with chest beating about how revolutionary the article is since there is a lack of information on the efficacy of spam. But, in their background section, they mention the previous work on pump and dump spam which is relatively easy to study. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pump_and_dump#Pump_and_dump_spam">Wikipedia</a> links to 3 studies that show that pump and dump spamming drove up prices of the touted stocks by 6% between 2005-6.  This is a pedantic point but distracts from the strength of their argument right away. </p>
<p>The deconstruction of Corman&#8217;s remarks is just outright weird. No telling why they didn&#8217;t just ask him what he meant and what numbers he was adding up. My guess is that instead of profit, he may have said or meant millions of dollars in damages, but I haven&#8217;t asked him either. The site that they link to doesn&#8217;t quote him, rather it attributes a paraphrased statement to him. This paraphrased statement is then put into quotes in the article, but the text in quotes doesn&#8217;t actually show up on the linked-to site. (Note, although we both work for the same company, I have never met nor talked to Corman.)</p>
<p>Gathering statistics by parasitic infiltration is ethically questionable. Counter attack is becoming more acceptable from a cyber war perspective, but it is not a generally acceptable security practice. I definitely do not consider it an ethical research practice. The paper extensively discusses the ethics of this practice and decides that since no one is left worse off than before that it must be ethically correct to allow it. I think this is disingenuous and disregards all of the arguments about why it is not an ethically sound security practice, primarily the argument that you might get it wrong and actually damage an innocent bystander inadvertently.</p>
<p>The spamalytics system alters the entity that they are studying and thus their statistics although interesting become questionable. The backend fulfilment or trojan delivery server is often quickly shut down in a real attack. They address this point in Figure 6, but don&#8217;t discount their conversion rate in any way nor do they site statistics about how quickly fulfilment servers are shut down to defend not discounting their conversion rate.</p>
<p>They wound up with 28 conversions for the pharmacy spam, but they didn&#8217;t allow the site to accept personal information. How many of the 28 users would actually have completed the transaction. How many of them were participants in the <a href="http://dangerousintersection.org/2009/04/30/scamming-the-nigerian-scammers/">scam the scammers</a> movement? Regardless, their conversion rate is amazingly low, as they state too low to sustain profitability for the spamming operation. </p>
<p>The researchers performed analysis on only one type of spammer &#8211; the ones motivated by money. The quality of the average spam clearly indicates that not every spammer is in it for the money. They are griefers, just like the griefers in online games who show up to &#8220;spoil it for the rest of us&#8221;. It would be worth running a similar research project on non-email spammers who are motivated by money to see if they are more profitable. Wired had an article about Craigslist in a recent issue and it included a paragraph on the problems that they have with spam. They manually remove spam from their listings. Captchas didn&#8217;t work because the spammers hired cheap labor to break the captcha. You can see this in Amazon&#8217;s Mechanical Turk where spammers offer users $0.01 to perform a spam like activity.</p>
<p>Because of these quibbles, I would not bet the house that spammers are unprofitable (or barely profitable) just based on these results. Despite these quibbles, I really enjoyed the time that I put in to reading this article and so I recommend that you go take a look too. Enjoy!</p>
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		<title>Fedora users love SELinux</title>
		<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/04/10/fedora-users-love-selinux/</link>
		<comments>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/04/10/fedora-users-love-selinux/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2008 17:19:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Emily Ratliff</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Planet LTC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[selinux]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ratliff.net/blog/index.php/2008/04/10/fedora-users-love-selinux/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Fedora Weekly News continues to be a(n unexpectedly) great source for security content. I&#8217;ve recently been cleaning up the backlog of my email and have discovered nuggets of valuable information such as 94% of Fedora 8 installs have SELinux enabled in Fedora Weekly News Issue 121 (Feb. 18, 2008). Now if you read the article, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fedora Weekly News continues to be a(n unexpectedly) great source for security content. I&#8217;ve recently been cleaning up the backlog of my email and have discovered nuggets of valuable information such as </p>
<p><strong>94% of Fedora 8 installs have SELinux enabled</strong></p>
<p>in <a href="http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FWN/Issue121#head-35d6cd0e48a356c31336109690072f3116231d24">Fedora Weekly News Issue 121</a> (Feb. 18, 2008). Now if you read the article, the number I selected to highlight is the raw number that James got off-list. 47%, 50%, and 74% were also tossed out there. Dan Walsh said that the statistics are misleading but being improved and Yaakov Nemoy says that smolt only measures 10% of Fedora machines. So, they are still working out the details. Even so, what they have measured so far is a quite a bit different from the statistics that we see about enterprise customers. I expect it is probably because Fedora users are satisfied with a completely open source stack and do not install as many 3rd party ISV applications which are not as integrated and do not have application specific SELinux policy. Still, this is an incredibly encouraging statistic. Once the Fedora community has been collecting the statistics a little longer, collects whether SELinux is enforcing or not, and starts publicizing these statistics widely, they may be able to help drive ISV adoption (or at least tolerance) of SELinux which will encourage commercial customers to follow the Fedora wave of early adopters on short order.</p>
<p>P.S. Yes, the title is tongue in cheek with a nod to the guys who participated in the discussion.</p>
<p><a href="http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FWN/Issue121">http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FWN/Issue121</a></p>
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		<title>Yellow Journalism and Software Bugs</title>
		<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/01/09/yellow-journalism-and-software-bugs/</link>
		<comments>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/01/09/yellow-journalism-and-software-bugs/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2008 17:51:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Emily Ratliff</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Planet LTC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open source]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ratliff.net/blog/index.php/2008/01/09/yellow-journalism-and-software-bugs/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Oh boy, I thought I had quibbles with the news story on the Coverity announcement yesterday and today someone points out the worst piece of yellow journalism that I have seen in quite some time: Open Source Code Contains Security Holes. First the title is atrocious and this quote &#8220;the popular open source backup and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh boy, I thought I had quibbles with the news story on the Coverity announcement yesterday and today someone points out the worst piece of yellow journalism that I have seen in quite some time: <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=205600229">Open  Source Code Contains Security Holes</a>. First the title is atrocious and this quote &#8220;the popular open source backup and recovery software running on half a million servers, were all found to have dozens or hundreds of security exposures and quality defects&#8221; may (have) be(en) accurate, but without context sounds worse than it really is. The truth, as George Wilson said, is that this is an article along the lines &#8220;And in other news, fire is hot and water is wet.&#8221; I personally consider this irresponsible journalism. They had to willfully ignore older stories based on information from Coverity and Carnegie Mellon such as <a href="http://www.linuxtoday.com/developer/2006031800826OSCYDV">Open Scrutiny of Open Source Code</a> which contains the nugget &#8220;The average defect rate of the open source applications was 0.434 bugs per 1000 lines of code. This compares with an average defect rate of 20 to 30 bugs per 1000 lines of code for commercial software, according to Carnegie Mellon University&#8217;s CyLab Sustainable Computing Consortium.&#8221; This is simply yellow journalism whose primary intention is to drive traffic and raise the ire of open source fans! Harrumph! Outrageous! </p>
<p>Note to Charles Babcock: software has bugs, even security bugs. If you want to drive down the number of bugs in the software that you are using, use open source. </p>
<p>This type of crappy response comes up almost every time Coverity announces a significant improvement. See this similar news story from ZDNet back in October 2006: <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/open-source/?p=809">Most open source is better</a>.</p>
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		<title>Coverity Announces that 11 Open Source Project have achieved &#8220;Rung 2&#8243;</title>
		<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/01/08/coverity-announces-that-11-open-source-project-have-achieved-rung-2/</link>
		<comments>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2008/01/08/coverity-announces-that-11-open-source-project-have-achieved-rung-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2008 22:11:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Emily Ratliff</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Linux]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Planet LTC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open source]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ratliff.net/blog/index.php/2008/01/08/coverity-announces-that-11-open-source-project-have-achieved-rung-2/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Coverity has announced &#8220;Rung 2&#8243; and that 11 open source projects have achieved &#8220;Rung 2&#8243;. This means that they have resolved all Rung 1 defects found by the latest release of Coverity Prevent. There is news coverage at news.com: 11 open-source projects certified as secure which claims that the projects &#8220;have been certified as free [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Coverity has <a href="http://scan.coverity.com/">announced &#8220;Rung 2&#8243;</a> and that 11 open source projects have achieved &#8220;Rung 2&#8243;. This means that they have resolved all Rung 1 defects found by the latest release of Coverity Prevent. There is news coverage at news.com: <a href="http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9843682-7.html?tag=nefd.top ">11 open-source projects certified as secure</a> which claims that the projects &#8220;have been certified as free of security defects&#8221;. The 11 projects with bragging rights are Amanda, NTP, OpenPAM, OpenVPN, Overdose, Perl, PHP, Postfix, Python, Samba, and TCL. The Coverity announcement itself says &#8220;resolved all of the defects identified at Rung 1&#8243;. Looking at the <a href="http://scan.coverity.com/">Rung 2</a> page, it appears to me that there are uninspected defects remaining at Rung 2 which may or may not represent actual defects (and/or actual security flaws), so I&#8217;m not sure that the news article&#8217;s claim is justified. I also would quibble with the use of the word &#8220;certified&#8221; which is at risk of becoming overused and rendered meaningless when applied in this context. Despite my quibbles with the news story, Coverity has done us all a major service by exercising their excellent source scanning tools on hundreds of open source projects and reporting the results in a controlled fashion. The 11 projects: Amanda, NTP, OpenPAM, OpenVPN, Overdose, Perl, PHP, Postfix, Python, Samba, and TCL, have done themselves proud by grinding through the reports and fixing defects found. Thanks to Homeland Security for sponsoring this effort, I appreciate this use of taxpayer money. Congratulations and a hearty Thanks! to Coverity and Amanda, NTP, OpenPAM, OpenVPN, Overdose, Perl, PHP, Postfix, Python, Samba, and TCL!</p>
<p>http://scan.coverity.com/</p>
<p>http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9843682-7.html?tag=nefd.top</p>
<p>http://scan.coverity.com/rung2.html</p>
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		<title>The path to sanity</title>
		<link>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2007/10/11/the-path-to-sanity/</link>
		<comments>http://www.ratliff.net/blog/2007/10/11/the-path-to-sanity/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Oct 2007 22:26:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Emily Ratliff</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Quality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ratliff.net/blog/index.php/2007/10/11/the-path-to-sanity/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If you are interested in security and security metrics, I highly recommend reading Dan Geer&#8217;s chart deck on &#8220;Measuring Security&#8221;. It weighs in at a hefty 426 pages, but it made me laugh out loud in parts and go hmmm. Highlights include p. 108 on &#8220;Decision Making&#8221; says &#8220;*Rational decisions are not enough, *Need to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you are interested in security and security metrics, I highly recommend reading Dan Geer&#8217;s chart deck on &#8220;Measuring Security&#8221;. It weighs in at a hefty 426 pages, but it made me laugh out loud in parts and go hmmm. Highlights include p. 108 on &#8220;Decision Making&#8221; says &#8220;*Rational decisions are not enough, *Need to also allow for your preferences&#8221;. I really like the model for &#8220;Tracking Performance&#8221; that he shows for selected security software on pages 154-156, but caution still needs to be applied and meta-information about the numbers is important for full understanding &#8211; did the product undergo extensive review one year? are the CVE&#8217;s equivalent to each other in severity? etc. Well worth a read and on my list for more more comprehensive study.</p>
<p>[1] Dan Geer, <a href="http://geer.tinho.net/usenix/measuringsecurity.tutorialv2.pdf">Measuring Security</a></p>
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